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Only twice in the History of Mankind, have women been 
considered legally equal to men. As far as we can see, this has 
occurred but twice : in Rome in Antiquity, and now in North America 
and Europe. We would like to tell you the amazing story of women’s 
emancipation in Rome. 
We qualify it as amazing, as it began rather badly. As you 
certainly know, the early Romans were patriarchal peasants, who 
considered their women as “ submen ” (if we dare say, 
“ Untermenschen ”, in German). The antifeminist Cato, in a public 
speech, recalled what the custom was under his forefathers : 
Liv., 34.2.11 : 
Maiores nostri nullam, ne privatam quidem rem agere feminas sine 
tutore auctore voluerunt, in manu esse parentium, fratrum, virorum ;(…). 
Our forefathers did not want women to be allowed to make any 
agreements, even private ones, without the consent of their tutor, so that 
they remain under the manus of either their parents, brothers or 
husbands…2 
During their entire lifetime, they were under the jurisdiction of a 
tutor. How was it then possible, that starting from such a sad 
condition, the Roman woman was able to reach emancipation ? We 
think  we can find the answer by looking at the first important piece 
of legislation in Ancient Rome, the so-called Twelve Tables. There 
                                                     
1 Ce texte a été présenté par J.-F. Gerkens, à Antalya, à l’occasion de la 54ème session 
de la Société Fernand de Visscher pour l’Histoire des Droits de l’Antiquité. 
2 Translation : R. Vigneron. 




we can see some unusual particularities for a patriarchal society, 
which could explain the beginning of the emancipation process, and 
that at four levels : 
First, in the matter of succession law : most authors now agree that 
the rule contained in the Sententiae of the Jurist Paul is really 
genuine : 
Pauli Sententiae 4.8.20 : 
Feminae ad hereditates legitimas ultra consanguineas successiones non 
admittuntur: idque iure civili Voconiana ratione videtur effectum. Ceterum 
lex duodecim tabularum nulla discretione sexus cognatos admittit. 
Women beyond consanguineous are not admitted in legitimate 
inheritances. This was decided by civil law in connection with the 
Voconia law. Moreover, the Twelve Tables made no differentiation 
between relatives of both sexes3. 
The Twelve Tables admitted agnatic parents (Let us remind that 
“ agnation is the tie connecting those related to each other by 
legitimate descent through males4 ”) without any discrimination by 
sex. At the beginning of the previous century, this rule seemed so 
unlikely to many scholars that they asserted that it must have been a 
copist’s mistake ! But nowadays the rule is admitted to have been in 
force as far back as the fifth century BC. Thus, daughters could 
inherit equally with their brothers. If you compare this with Islamic 
law, for instance, which provides “ the son should obtain two parts of 
a daughter ”, the difference is undeniable ! 
Secondly, let’s consider the Roman conception of the right to 
property. It has correctly been written by Buckland and Thomas in 
their “ Textbooks of Roman Law ” that Roman ownership, the 
dominium,  “ is the ultimate right,  that which has no right behind 
it5 ”, “ the ultimate legal title beyond and above which there was no 
other6 ”.  A  power  undifferentiated  from  that  which  the head of 
the household had over his wife and children.  This power enabled 
the paterfamilias to dispose of his goods even after his death by 
                                                     
3 Translation : R. Vigneron. 
4 W.W.BUCKLAND, A Textbook of Roman Law, 3rd edition, by P.STEIN, Cambridge 
1975, p.368. 
5 W.W.BUCKLAND, op.cit., p.188. 
6 J.A.C.THOMAS, Textbook of Roman Law, Amsterdam-New York-Oxford 1976, 
p.134. 
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means of a testament. His last will was to be observed without any 
restriction, as the Twelve Tables declared : 
XII Tab., 5, 3 : 
Uti legassit super pecunia tutelave suae rei, ita ius esto.  
As he disposed of his goods and the guardianship, so shall be the law7. 
That rule could be beneficial to a woman in two ways : she could 
inherit the man’s estate, facilitating in that way her economic 
independence. But furthermore and thirdly, her father and 
paterfamilias could legally nominate an outsider as tutor in his 
testament, instead of a relative. And this outsider, having no prospect 
of inheritance from the woman (contrary to a relative), could let her 
manage her business just as she saw fit.  
The law of the Twelve Tables provided a fourth means for female 
independence : the so-called ius trinoctii. The teacher of Roman law, 
Gaius, explained the phenomenon to his students in this way : 
Gai.1.111 : 
Usu in manum conveniebat, quae anno continuo nupta perseverabat: 
nam velut annua possessione usu capiebatur, in familiam viri transiebat 
filiaeque locum optinebat. Itaque lege duodecim tabularum cautum est, 
ut si qua nollet eo modo in manum mariti convenire, ea quotannis 
trinoctio abesset atque eo modo cuiusque anni usum interrumperet. Sed 
hoc totum ius partim legibus sublatum est, partim ipsa desuetudine 
obliteratum est. 
A woman used to fall into marital subordination by usage if she 
remained in the married state for a continuous period of one year : for she 
was, as it were, usucapted by a year’s possession, and would pass into her 
husband’s kin in the relationship of a daughter. The Twelve Tables 
therefore provided that if any woman did not wish to become subordinate 
to her husband in this way, she should each year absent herself for a 
period of three nights, and in this way interrupt the usage of each year. 
But this whole legal state was in part repealed by statute, in part blotted 
out by simple disuse8. 
A  wife  who  didn’t  go  through a specific ceremony 
(confarreatio  or  coemptio)  in  order  to enter in her husband’s 
                                                     
7 Translation : R. Vigneron. 
8 Translation by M.R. LEFKOWITZ and M.B. FANT, in Women’s Life in Greece and 
Rome2, Baltimore 1992, p. 112. 




family and be placed under his manus, fell nevertheless under his 
power after living with him for one full year. But she could escape 
this fate by sleeping outside the home  three  nights  each year.  In 
this way she remained in her family, staying thus submitted to her 
father, but living the rest of the year with her husband, out of her 
father’s reach. 
So, from the very beginning of Roman law, Roman women had 
better opportunities to become emancipated than in many other 
cultures. 
But the real  process  of  independence  took place at the start of 
the second century BC. In the year 214, a so-called Lex Oppia was 
voted, which forbade all women in the city of Rome any luxury 
expenses (for example, having more than a half-ounce of gold, 
wearing multicoloured dresses, etc.).  These prohibitions were 
perhaps  justified  by the hardships of the  Punic War9.  But in the 
year 195, the war was over and the women made several public 
demonstrations in order to abolish the Lex Oppia. Precisely on this 
occasion, Cato made the speech we already mentionned10 but his 
efforts were in vain : the Lex was abrogated ! 
26 years later,  the same  Cato  got  a bit of his own back by 
having the  Lex Voconia  adopted ;  it  prohibited men of the first 
class of the census (the wealthiest) from nominating henceforth a 
woman as heiress ;  neither could she receive more than half the 
estate as legatee. Why did Cato obtain such prohibitions from the 
consilium plebis ?  Professor  Vigneron  once  wrote  a paper about 
the  Lex Voconia :  he then found in the literature 14 reasons to 
explain Cato’s attitude11. Actually, we think that two reasons are 
sufficient : Cato was an antifeminist (that’s well known !) and 
politically he was a conservative : the wives of first class men were 
politically the most dangerous.  For they could, by becoming 
widowed  or  divorced  and then re-marrying a man from another 
class of the census, and giving him her dowry and her other goods, 
unsettle the political power. We must remember that it was in fact 
                                                     
9 Comp. C. HERRMANN, Le rôle judiciaire et politique des femmes sous la République 
romaine, Bruxelles 1964, p. 54 ss. 
10 Liv.34.2.11. 
11 R. VIGNERON, L'antiféministe Loi Voconia et les “ Schleichwege des Lebens”, 
Labéo 29 (1983) p. 140 ss. 
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men of the first class of the census who had the political power in 
Rome. 
Whatever the purpose of this law might have been, what is most 
interesting about the  Lex Voconia  is to observe how many tricks 
were used to avoid its application. Tricks discovered by both jurists 
and people. 
First of all, we must remember that men of the first class where 
those having an estate of 100.000 sestertius. But, as jurists have 
explained,  having such an estate was not sufficient to be bound by 
the law. It was also necessary to be noted as a man of the first class in 
the census. And the census occurred only once every five years. 
Meanwhile, the testator could nominate his wife or daughter as 
heiress. 
Another of the jurists’ inventions is the so-called legatum 
partitionis,  which was a legacy of part of the inheritance as such :  
the gift did not make the legatee an heir and so avoided the 
prohibition of the  Lex Voconia  (an example of this trick can be 
found in the next Text) : 
Cic., pro Caec. 4.12 : 
(…) Nam brevi tempore M. Fulcinius adolescens mortuus est ; heredem 
P. Caesennium fecit ; uxori grande pondus argenti matrique partem 
maiorem bonorum legavit. Itaque in partem mulieres vocatae sunt. 
(…) For soon after, the young Marcus Fulcinius died, making Publius 
Caesennius his heir, subject to the payment of a large sum of money to his 
wife and the greater part of his property to his mother. In these 
circumstances the two women were called for an aliquot part of the 
inheritance12. 
According to many recent authors, the legatum partitionis was 
invented precisely with this aim in mind. 
A third discovery of Roman jurists was the fideicommissum. As 
Professor  J.A.C.  Thomas describes,  “ They were, originally, 
charges upon the instituted  heir  or on a  legatee  to transfer,  upon 
his honour what he received under the will to another designated 
ultimate beneficiary and (…) could be used, e.g. to convey to a 
woman  more than she was allowed under the  lex Voconia(…). 
This ” he continues,  “ postulates their legal efficacy.  In the 
                                                     
12 Translation : R. Vigneron ; see BUCKLAND, op.cit., p.353. 




Republic,  they had none  (…). A change came, however, in the 
earlier empire  (…)13 ” and  the  fideicommissum  became 
enforceable. 
What the Roman people themselves invented to promote the 
economic independence of Roman women is easy to show in the 
juristic literature : their testaments, for example, were often very 
favourable to wives, particularly concerning the dowry. The dowry 
indeed played an important part in the life  of  Roman  wives.  As 
their husbands were obliged to give the dowry back in the case of a 
marriage’s dissolution, it was a bridle on divorce.  And if the 
marriage  came to an end,  by divorce  or  by the  husband’s  death, 
the wife was certain to get her dowry back.  For instance, if there 
were any  difficulties  between the  heir and the widow concerning 
her dowry, the testator very often took the woman’s side and the 
jurists always did. We are presenting only one example of this 
phenomenon, but there are many others : 
D.33.4.6pr. (Lab., l.2 post. a Iav. epit.) : 
Cum scriptum esset: "quae pecunia propter uxorem meam ad me 
venit quinquaginta, tantundem pro ea dote heres meus dato", quamvis 
quadraginta dotis fuissent, tamen quinquaginta debere Alfenus Varus 
Servium respondisse scribit, quia proposita summa quinquaginta adiecta 
sit. 
When it had been written, “ as for that money, fifty, which came to me 
on account of my wife, let my heir give her so much in lieu of that 
dowry ”, although the dowry had been of forty, nevertheless, Alfenus 
Varus writes that Servius replied that he owed fifty, because the sum 
intended had been written in as fifty14. 
The last (but not the least) manner to consolidate a widow’s 
economic destiny was undoubtedly to legate to her the  usufruct of 
her husband’s whole estate. The ususfructus of an entire estate, 
bequeathed to a young widow during her lifetime, could represent 
much more than the value of  half the estate and would thus violate 
the Lex Voconia. But the Roman jurists seem never to have been 
aware of that reality. On the contrary, when a certain Lex Falcidia 
provided, in the year 40 BC, that legacies were not to exceed three-
                                                     
13 THOMAS, op.cit., p.511. 
14 The English translation of the Digest sources is edited by Alan WATSON, 4 vol., 
Philadelphia 1985. 
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quarters of the net value of the estate, jurists  immediately15  
discussed how to evaluate the usufructs. It seems to us that such a 
difference in  attitude about the same problem is unlikely to have 
been a mere stroke of luck. And if the jurists didn’t care about the 
evaluation of the widow’s usufruct, this can perhaps be explained, 
when we remember Cato’s fear, that is that the first class of citizens 
could be unsettled by outsiders becoming new husbands.  But this 
fear didn’t exist with an usufruct legacy, since it necessarily ends at 
the very latest at the widow’s death. The legacy then returns to the 
children, thus remaining inside the same family. 
As the economic independence of women was thus largely 
ensured, their juridical independence was yet to be attained. This 
occurred in five different areas : 
1.-  First of all, let’s consider the area of  guardianship  or  tutela. 
It has been said that  Roman  women initially were under the 
authority of their  tutor  their entire life.  But the first rift in the 
tutor’s authority  was the  so-called  optio tutoris :  a husband who 
had his wife under his power (his manus) was able to give her 
through his testament the right to choose herself the guardian she 
preferred. She could use this option sometimes once, sometimes 
twice, or as often as she liked. In such cases, the acting tutor 
undoubtedly  was  usually not highly motivated to thwart her 
wishes… 
Secondly, when August tried favouring an increase in the birth 
rate,  he exempted from  guardianship all Roman free women who 
had  three  children  (and all  manumitted women  who had four). 
This  law  definitively removed any previous justification for 
women’s guardianship :  the so-called imbecillitas or levitas sexus, 
i.e. their silliness.  In fact, if they were really silly, how could having 
a third or fourth child make them suddenly sane ? 
A few decades later, the emperor Claudius abolished the agnatic 
relatives’ guardianship, except for manumitted and emancipated 
women.   Meanwhile, the magistrate  praetor  had strongly 
contributed to women’s freedom in two ways :  when the tutor 
refused to  authorise  a contract the woman wanted to make,  she 
could appeal to the praetor and the latter would force the tutor to 
admit the contract. And finally, when her tutor was absent, the 
                                                     
15 See Paul., Fr.Vat., 68 : “ veteres ” v. Aristo. 




woman could ask the magistrate to give her another. And that rule, as 
we learn from the teacher Gaius, was provided by a senatus-
consultus. But the jurists gave a broad interpretation of the word 
“ absence ” : a short absence was enough to replace the tutor… who, 
finally, had very little to say, as Gaius synthesises in : 
Gai., Inst. 1.190 
Feminas vero perfectae aetatis in tutela esse fere nulla pretiosa ratio 
suasisse videtur. Nam quae vulgo creditur, quia levitate animi plerumque 
decipiuntur et aequum erat eas tutorum auctoritate regi, magis speciosa 
videtur quam vera: mulieres enim quae perfectae aetatis sunt, ipsae sibi 
negotia tractant, et in quibusdam causis dicis gratia tutor interponit 
auctoritatem suam; saepe etiam invitus auctor fieri a praetore cogitur. 
There seems, on the other hand, to have been no very worthwhile 
reason why women who have reached the age of maturity should be in 
guardianship ; for the argument which is commonly believed, that because 
they are scatterbrained they are frequently subject to deception and that it 
was proper for them to be under guardian’s authority, seems to be 
specious rather than true. For women of full age deal with their own 
affairs for themselves, and while in certain instances that guardian 
interposes his authorisation for form’s sake, he is often compelled by the 
praetor to give authorisation, even against his wishes16. 
2.- The second area in which Roman women, but Roman men as 
well, gained a great deal of freedom is betrothal. Initially the fathers 
of the future fiancés concluded an agreement with each other, one 
promising his daughter, the other warranting that his son would marry 
her. And both promises were enforceable : in case of non-fulfilment 
either a sum was foreseen and had to be paid or a condemnation by a 
judge was obtainable. In the classical period of Roman Law, things 
had completely changed : breach of promise was no longer 
actionable, even though there was a penal stipulation for failure to 
honour the marriage agreement ; such stipulations were regarded (…) 
as contra bonos mores17, immoral ! 
D.45.1.134pr. (Paul., l.15 Resp.) : 
Titia, quae ex alio filium habebat, in matrimonium coit Gaio Seio 
habente familiam: et tempore matrimonii consenserunt, ut filia Gaii Seii 
filio Titiae desponderetur, et interpositum est instrumentum et adiecta 
                                                     
16 Translation by LEFKOWITZ and FANT, op.cit., p.99. 
17 J.A.C. THOMAS, op.cit., p.420. 
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poena, si quis eorum nuptiis impedimento fuisset: postea Gaius Seius 
constante matrimonio diem suum obiit et filia eius noluit nubere: quaero, 
an Gaii Seii heredes teneantur ex stipulatione. Respondit ex stipulatione, 
quae proponeretur, cum non secundum bonos mores interposita sit, 
agenti exceptionem doli mali obstaturam, quia inhonestum visum est 
vinculo poenae matrimonia obstringi sive futura sive iam contracta. 
Titia, who had a son by another man, married Gaius Seius, who had a 
daughter. During the marriage, they agreed that the husband’s daughter 
should be engaged to the wife’s son. A deed was drawn up and a penalty 
attached in case either spouse impeded the marriage. Later Gaius Seius, 
still married to Titia, died. His daughter refused to marry. Are the heirs of 
Gaius Seius bound by the stipulation ? Paul replied that the stipulation 
mentioned was contrary to sound morals, so that an action on it would be 
met by the defense of fraud. It is regarded as degrading for the bond of 
marriage, present or future, to be secured by a penalty. 
3.- The end of this text demonstrates the third area of freedom : it 
concerns the marriage itself, which was conceived in Antiquity as a 
purely private affair, regarding by no means either the State or any 
other authority (by the way : it’s with the Christian emperors that the 
authorities intervene for the first time in these matters, not earlier). 
This private affair was juridically a contract of society (consortium 
omnis vitae, as it was told). And like any society under Roman law, 
the marriage rested only on the continuing agreement of the parties. 
This conception implies that each spouse – the wife like the husband 
– could decide at any time that the marriage was over. Such a 
decision was sufficient to end the marriage and provoke divorce. We 
can see an amazing example of this phenomenon in a letter sent to 
Cicero in which a friend of his tells him the latest gossip in Rome :  
Cic ., ad fam. 8.7 : 
1.- (…) Breviores has litteras properanti publicanorum tabellario 
subito dedi ; tuo liberto pluribus verbis scriptas pridie dederam. 2.- Res 
autem novae nullae sane acciderunt, nisi haec vis tibi scribi… quae certe 
vis : Cornificius adulescens Orestillae filiam sibi despondit ; Paula 
Valeria, soror Triarii, divortium sine causa, quo die vir e provincia 
venturus erat, fecit ; nuptura est Decimo Bruto. Mundum rettuleram. 
Multa in hoc genere incredibilia te absente acciderunt. Servius Ocella 
nemini persuasisset se moechum esse, nisi triduo bis depensus esset. 
Quaeres, ubi. Ubi hercules ego minime vellem. 




1. (…) I handed this unusually brief letter to a carrier employed by the 
publicani, at short notice, because he was in a hurry. I had handed a 
longer one on the preceding day to your freedman. 2.- But absolutely 
nothing new has occurred, unless you want such tittle-tattle as what 
follows – and I am sure you do – to be put in a letter to you. Cornificius 
the younger has promised to marry Orestilla’s daughter. Paula Valeria, the 
sister of Triarius, has divorced her husband without assigning any reason, 
on the very day that he was to arrive from his province. She is going to 
marry Decimus Brutus. She had sent back her whole wardrobe. Many 
incredible things of that sort have occurred in your absence. Servius 
Ocella would never have convinced anybody that he was an adulterer, had 
he not been caught in the act twice within three days. You will ask 
where ? Well, I swear it was in the very last place I could have 
wished…18 
And if we return for just a moment to the end of the previous text, 
we see that not only was the divorce easy to obtain, but it was also 
forbidden to try to maintain a marriage by a penalty : sive iam 
contracta (matrimonia) “ a present marriage has not to be secured by 
a penalty ”.  
4 .-  The  fourth  area of women’s emancipation brings us to a 
fairy tale : in this very way, Professor Andreas Wacke tells the story 
of many Cinderella-like slaves who where delivered from their sad 
destiny by a Prince Charming19.  Not really always a Prince 
Charming, if we remember that senators, their sons and grandsons 
couldn’t  marry  a manumitted slave woman ;  but all the other 
Roman citizens could.   And they could even buy such a slave 
woman, and manumit her with the aim of marrying her.  And 
August’s laws, which restricted the possibility of manumitting (the 
manumitter had to be at least  20 years  old and the manumitted at 
least 30) precisely provided some exceptions, among them the 
manumissio matrimonii causa,  manumission with the aim of 
marrying the  manumitted.  In this case, there was  no age 
requirement (except, of course the age of nubility).   The emperor 
thus promoted slave women’s freedom.  It must be admitted that he 
didn’t have the same opinion in the opposite case,  when a free 
                                                     
 18 Translation by T.E.PAGE, E.CAPPS and W.H.D.RONSE, Cicero – The Letters to his 
Friends II, London undated, p.127. 
19 A. WACKE, Manumissio matrimonii causa : le mariage d’affranchies d’après les 
lois d’Auguste, RH 67(1989) p.413ss. 
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woman manumitted a male slave in order to marry him. Such a 
situation must have occurred only rarely, and was considered as 
immoral. With one exception however : when the woman had herself 
been a slave, had been manumitted and had acquired the property of 
the slave with whom she had lived previously (a so-called 
contubernium). In this case, Love was taken into account ! 
The same reason (we mean : Love) led the Roman people to yet 
another indulgence, in the case of the abduction of a woman. There is 
a Latin proverb which says : raptor aut pereat aut ducat : “ the 
abductor either perishes or espouses ”. That’s to say : if the girl really 
loves him and is willing to marry him, he escapes from any penalty. 
This is not in a fairy tale, but a real juridical story ! 
To come back to the manumitted women slaves who were to 
marry,  there was obviously a  danger  in such manumissions :  that 
the slave woman, eager for freedom, would promise to marry her 
master but would change her mind after her manumission. But 
Augusts’ laws provided the catch : the manumitted bride had six 
months to effectively marry her  former  master.  After that time, if 
the marriage had not taken place, the manumission was void : she 
would again return to slavery ! So, her freedom was thus in 
“ suspension ”,  and so was the  status  of her  future child,  in the 
case – not very unlikely – where the bride was pregnant :  the next 
text shows us such a case : 
D.40.2.19pr. (Cels., l. 29 Dig.) : 
Si minor annis apud consilium matrimonii causa praegnatem 
manumiserit eaque interim pepererit, in pendenti erit, servus an liber sit, 
quem ea peperit. 
If a minor with a council has manumitted a pregnant woman for the 
purpose of marriage and she has given birth in the interim, it is not settled 
whether the child is slave or free. 
After the wedding, the former slave woman, who had become 
definitively free and had acquired her husband’s dignity, was not 
allowed to divorce without his permission. It’s one of the rare 
exceptions to the rule of  freedom  of  divorce,  due to the fact that 
she was not only the wife but also manumitted and as such, had to 
pay the  duty of  respectful  conduct  towards her “ patron ”. The 
same duty was to be paid in the case where her former master, after 
having manumitted her, didn’t marry her but lived with her in 




concubinage :  she could not leave against the will of her 
concubinary. 
5.- This leads us to the fifth area of women’s emancipation : 
concubinage, or better said, concubinate (for concubinate in Rome 
was a juridical institution). The story of this institution is rather 
amazing too. For a Roman jurist once said ironically that the 
concubinate was born from August’s laws20. Indeed this emperor 
pursued the aim of moralising the Roman people. He therefore 
forbade a whole range of marriages : for example, a Roman free-born 
citizen was not allowed to marry a woman condemned for adultery, 
nor a prostitute, a bawd, a stage-performer nor a woman condemned 
by a criminal court. Of course, senators and their family couldn’t 
marry any of those women, but they were forbidden to wed any 
freedwoman as well ! Now, if we remember that all these women 
were at the same time considered as feminae in quas stuprum non 
committitur, women with whom sexual intercourse was not 
punishable, if a senator, for instance, fell in love with a freedwoman, 
he had no other solution than to live with her in concubinate. Some 
emperors did the same, after the death of their wives. And outside 
Rome, the provincials, following the example of the Romans, began 
practising concubinate too, even when they had the legal possibility 
to marry ! 
What were the advantages of that practice ? For the woman, they 
are undoubtedly : first, as she usually has a lower social status than 
her partner, she shares his status, for a concubine suffers no social 
disapproval. Secondly, no dowry was needed (a poor woman could 
thus have a normal relationship with a man) ; thirdly gifts – that are 
always  prohibited  between husband and wife and vice-versa  –  are 
on the contrary permitted between concubines, who may leave all 
their legacy to each other as they wished,  as the  Lex Voconia  did 
not apply in this case.   And the  fifth  advantage is that Augustus’ 
law on adultery did not apply either. Finally, concubines were 
allowed to make all kinds of agreements together, even those that 
could be considered as immoral today, as the following juristic text 
shows us : 
D.44.7.61.1 (Scaev., l. 28 Dig.) : 
                                                     
20 Marcel.-Marcian., l. 12 inst., D. 25.7.3.1. 
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Seia, cum salarium constituere vellet, ita epistulam emisit: “ Lucio 
Titio salutem. Si in eodem animo et eadem affectione circa me es, quo 
semper fuisti, ex continenti acceptis litteris meis distracta re tua veni hoc: 
tibi quamdiu vivam praestabo annuos decem. Scio enim quia valde me 
bene ames ”. Quaero, cum et rem suam distraxerit Lucius Titius et ad 
eam profectus sit et ex eo cum ea sit, an ei ex his epistulis salarium 
annuum debeatur. Respondit ex personis causisque eum cuius notio sit 
aestimaturum, an actio danda sit. 
Seia, wishing to fix a salary, sent a letter as follows: “ To Lucius 
Titius, greeting. If you are of the same mind and of the same regard to me 
as you have always been, then, on receipt of my letter, forthwith dispose 
of your estate, and come here. I shall provide you with ten yearly for as 
long as I live. For I know that you love me very well ”. My question is 
whether, if Lucius Titius did sell his estate and went to her and since that 
time has been with her, the annual salary is due to him in terms of this 
letter. The answer was that the person having cognizance of the case shall 
have to decide from the persons and the circumstances whether an action 
ought to be granted. 
As says the jurist : an actio danda sit : it’s possible that Lucius 
Titius can institute proceedings against his lover Seia ! And now 
comes the big question in conclusion : why did Roman legislators, 
Roman magistrates, Roman jurists, Roman lawyers and Roman 
judges – all men, without any exception – promote women’s 
emancipation ? In our civilisation today, the answer is easy to find : 
we now know that men and women are genetically equal, that only an 
iota of difference makes an embryo a boy rather than a girl, and vice-
versa. But why did the ancient Romans have a similar view ? We 
sincerely don’t know the answer. We can just venture an opinion : 
they all had a deep sense of equality. Our opinion is based on a 
sentence found at the beginning of Justinian’s famous Digest : it’s the 
definition of law by the jurisconsult Celsius : ius est ars boni et 
aequi : 
D.1.1.1pr. (Ulp., l. 1 Inst.) : 
Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris 
descendat. Est autem a iustitia appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus 
definit, ius est ars boni et aequi. 
A law student at the outset of his studies ought first to know the 
derivation of the word ius. Its derivation is from the word iustitia. For, in 




terms of Celsus’ elegant definition, the law is the art of goodness and 
fairness. 
If Law is a mixture of  bonum,  that’s to say the common good, 
and aequum, that means fairness in trials, but in a broader sense, 
equality, if Law must be equal, that implies that human beings, 
subjects of rights, are necessarily equal. There would be no sense in 
defining the law as something that ought to be equal in a society 
divided in casts : the law there must be unequal ! Of course, the 
Romans lived in a world with many inequalities : there were slaves, 
peregrines and barbaric peoples.  But inside  the  Roman  people 
itself, the rule of  juridical  equality  was the duty to be pursued.  And 
a famous author writing about Roman and European law, Helmut 
Coing, said that in this  definition  of  law  lay the embryo of the 
famous slogan of the French Revolution : “ Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité 21. 
It took 16 centuries for this embryo to be born, two more centuries 
before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and it will perhaps 
take a millennium more to see these rights universally enforced. But 
we believe, and we are not alone to do so, that the very idea of 
equality between men – and women – is already to be found in the 
definition of Celsius. 
Now we would like to take just a few seconds in closing, to 
observe that this period of women’s emancipation ended abruptly at 
the beginning of the fourth century AD with the arrival of the 
Christian emperors. In the opinion of the apostle Paul (First epistle to 
the Corinthians 11.3), “ …the head of every man is Christ ; and the 
head of the woman is man ; and the head of Christ is God ”. The 
Roman legislator again placed women in their secular, second rank. 
Let’s look at just one example, one concerning betrothal, a 
constitution of the emperor Constantine provides : 
CTh.3.5.5 :  
Constantinus A. ad Pacatianum Pf. U. : Patri puellae aut tutori aut 
curatori aut cuilibet eius affini non liceat, quum prius militi puellam 
desponderit, eandem alii in matrimonium tradere. quod si intra 
biennium, ut perfidiae reus in insulam relegetur. (…) 
                                                     
21 H.COING, Europäisches Privatrecht I, München 1985, p.31. 
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Emperor Constantine Augustus to Pacatianus Praetorian Prefect : The 
father of a girl or her tutor, curator, or any kinsman shall not be permitted 
to give her in marriage to another after having previously betrothed her to 
a soldier. If the girl should be given in marriage to another within two 
years, the guilty of such perfidy shall be exiled by relegation to an island 
(…)22. 
As you can see, the girl is once again “ given ” to a soldier without 
asking if she is willing. And this betrothal was binding for two years 
under strong penalty. But this is yet another story, we don’t have the 
time to tell you that one today. 
 
                                                     
22 Translation by C. PHARR, The Theodosian Code, New York 1952, p.67. 
